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Abstract
We analyze a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game played in a community setting with het-
erogeneous types. Some players are bad types, programmed to defect, others are good types,
programmed to cooperate, and others yet choose actions to maximize their discounted pay-
oﬀs. Players are also able to strategically choose whether to continue interacting with the same
partner - form a long term relationship - or separate and seek a new partner. We show that
the ability to form long term relationships facilitates the achievement of cooperative outcomes
without information ﬂows, without instability due to observational errors, and without a central
coordinating device to synchronize players’ actions. We also show that the heterogeneity of
types helps, rather than hinders, cooperative behavior by inducing players to avoid bad types
that inﬂict low payoﬀs on them and seek good (or opportunistic) types that bestow high payoﬀs.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Overview and Results. The theory of repeated games has shown how ineﬃciencies that natu-
rally arise in a game setting (as opposed to a competitive setting) can be rectiﬁed if the game is
repeated, and if players are able to condition their present behavior on past behavior. This idea
has been shown to work under a variety of circumstances, including the possibility that the game
is played in a community setting, where players interact with varying opponents and, hence, where
quick and personal retaliation are not feasible. This community setting scenario is explored in pa-
pers by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994), who ﬁnd that although it is possible to sustain eﬃciency,
the informational requirements needed to do so are not light. In particular, an individual needs
to have information about behavior in interactions in which she did not participate. Alternatively,
she may need to be able to synchronize her behavior with others’ behavior by perfectly observing
a public coordination device, or, else, the stability of eﬃcient behavior cannot be guaranteed.
The present paper continues this line of research by studying the role that the endogenous for-
mation of long-term relationships may play in sustaining eﬃcient behavior. Unlike previous analysis
we consider the situation where the choice of a partner to interact with is (partly) endogenous, and
hence where interaction is neither perfectly anonymous (as in the community setting) nor perfectly
intimate (as in the traditional repeated game setting). Instead, a player, in addition to choosing her
action, also chooses whether to keep interacting with her present partner, or seek a new partner.
Another departure of our setting from previous analysis is that we accommodate the heterogeneity
of types and, in particular, the presence of commitment types that are programmed to play speciﬁc
actions.
What we ﬁnd in this setting is that the community may be able to enforce eﬃcient behavior,
and make this behavior stable, while relying on minimal informational requirements. In particular,
a player needs to know only what her present partner did in interacting with her, and not what the
partner (or anyone else) did in interacting with others in the distant past. Furthermore, an indi-
vidual does not have to synchronize her behavior with others’ behavior by perfectly observing the
outcome of a public coordination device. In this sense, what we show is that endogenously forming
long-term relationships and keeping track of information that is internal to such relationships is
suﬃcient to achieve eﬃcient outcomes.
2Another ﬁnding that emerges from our analysis is that heterogeneity of types helps, rather
than hinders, sustain eﬃcient outcomes. In essence, the fact that players have control over who to
interact with and that diﬀerent players are of diﬀerent types, implies that players avoid interacting
with types whose behavior might harm them, and seek interacting with types whose behavior
might beneﬁt them. If this objective (namely the search for a beneﬁcial partner) is accomplished
by cooperating with one’s partner, then heterogeneity helps achieve cooperation and thereby raise
players’ payoﬀs.
In somewhat greater detail, we study a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game in the context of
a community with a continuum of agents. Each agent in the community is one of three types:
either bad, which means she defects unconditionally (i.e., independent of her personal history), or
good, which means she cooperates unconditionally, or she is an opportunist who chooses actions to
maximize discounted payoﬀs. Players in the community are matched in pairs to play a prisoners’
dilemma game in each period. An agent learns her opponent’s action, and may choose to stay in a
relationship with this opponent in the next period, or separate and be matched with another agent.
We focus on a class of equilibria in this setting in which strategies are particularly simple: Strategies
are such that an individual immediately separates from her partner if she encounters uncooperative
behavior. In addition, an individual’s choice of action is only conditioned on whether she is about
to interact with her partner for the ﬁrst time, or whether she has already interacted with him in
the past.
Given this game and the class of strategies we focus on, our aim is to determine equilibrium
behaviors. More speciﬁcally, for any conﬁguration of parameter values, we determine whether there
is a pure and/or a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In doing so we link parameters values (payoﬀsi n
the payoﬀ matrix, the discount factor, the rate of turnover in the community, and the conﬁguration
of types in the community) to behavior that is manifested in equilibrium. This link enables us then
to establish comparative static properties of the equilibria.
Armed with these results we are able to be more precise about the intuitions we suggested
earlier. For example we are able to show that the proportion of bad types must exceed some
critical value (and must be no bigger than another critical value) to induce all opportunists to
cooperate in equilibrium. We are also able to show that if the proportion of good types exceeds
some critical value the dismal equilibrium in which players unconditionally defect no longer exists.
3This contrast with standard results of the theory of repeated games, whereby the dismal equilibrium
is the “easiest” one to construct. We oﬀer a closed-form characterization of these critical values,
and oﬀer additional intuitions about these results in the body of the paper.
In an extension of the model we endogenize the conﬁguration of types in the community by
giving individuals the option to invest in human capital, which expands the range of actions avail-
able to them (converting them from bad to opportunistic types). This extension enables us to
study the interplay between investment in human capital and cooperative behavior, showing that
more educated populace is positively correlated with more civil (or cooperative) behavior in the
community. The extension also enables us to do welfare exercises, contrasting the equilibrium
with a planner’s optimum. This comparison identiﬁes two kinds of departures between equilibrium
and optimum. In one departure individuals under-invest because the fruits of their investments
are partially enjoyed by others. In another departure individuals over-invest because of a conﬂict
between ex-ante and ex-post incentives: On the one hand, it pays individuals to invest ex-ante
to be “eligible” for the beneﬁts of long-term relationships; on the other hand, having invested, an
individual may defect because equilibrium in the community game dictates that a certain fraction
of agents defect. Because of that, some of the ex-ante investments are not utilized ex-post, which
implies they are wasted from a social point of view.
Although this paper is intended as a theoretical exploration, anecdotal evidence suggests that
the forces we identify here are of empirical relevance. One anecdote suggesting this comes from the
banking industry and, in particular, the practice of “customer relationships.” Roughly speaking,
this practice is such that established customers, who pay back their loans on time, are able to enter
into (or sustain) long-term relationships, and borrow at a lower interest rate or borrow a larger
amount. On the other hand, new customers may have to pay a higher interest rate or borrow a
smaller amount, and customers who are not current on their loans are denied credit and may have to
turn to other institutions for future business, and pay a higher interest rate. Thereby, the promise
of forming a long-term relationship and enjoying favorable terms, and the punishment of severing
a relationship, having to start from scratch, and suﬀering unfavorable terms induces borrowers to
behave honestly. Other examples in the same spirit are seniority in employment relationships, or
securing long-term contracts in procurement and buyer-supplier relationships. A more extensive
discussion of real-world institutions of this type that operate in various contexts may be found in
4papers by Johnson et al. (2002), Kali (1999), Kranton (1996), and Taylor (2000).
Brief literature review Apart from the community setting papers that we already mentioned,
there is a small literature on “building trust” that we base our formulation on. This literature
started in a little known paper by Dutta (1993), in which he shows that playing more and more
cooperative actions over time is a way to gradually achieve eﬃcient outcomes. This idea is signiﬁ-
cantly extended in Ghosh and Ray (1996) who incorporate (impatient) types into their framework,
and reﬁne the set of equilibria that arise based on the criterion of renegotiation proofness. Com-
pared to those papers, the present paper makes three contributions. First the component game
we analyze is a standard prisoners’ dilemma game with two actions and, therefore, with a limited
scope for trust building and gradual convergence to cooperation. Instead, our focus is on the incen-
tivating role that the heterogeneity of types plays. The second contribution is that we consider a
richer framework with good types as well as bad and opportunistic types, and explore a wider class
of equilibria. In doing so, we provide a full characterization of the set of pure and mixed-strategy
equilibria, relate them to underlying parameters, and do comparative statics exercises. The third
contribution is that we extend the model to study investment in human capital, how it interacts
with cooperation, and what its welfare properties are.
Another paper that relates to our theme is Sobel (2002). He focuses, however, on the role of
legal rules and does not deal with the heterogeneity of types. A diﬀerent approach is taken by Tirole
(1996) and Dixit (2003) who study community games appended with information intermediaries
that make information available to players. Somewhat more tangential to our theme (although still
relevant) are papers by Eeckhout (2002), Lindsey (2002) et al., and Watson (2002).
Preview. The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces our framework. In
Section 3 we determine when the pure-strategy good equilibrium, in which opportunists always
cooperate, exists and how it depends on parameters. In Section 4 we do the same thing with
respect to the pure-strategy bad equilibrium in which opportunists always defect. In Section 5 we
study mixed-strategy equilibria. In Section 6 we classify all equilibria and relate them to parameter
values. In Section 7 we relate social welfare to the heterogeneity of types. And, in section 8, we
extend the model to study investment in human capital, how it interacts with cooperative behavior,
and what departures may exist between the equilibrium of this investment game and the social
5optimum. Some proofs are found in a technical appendix, while others are found in a working
paper version.
2M o d e l F o r m u l a t i o n
The Environment We consider a community of individuals (or players or agents), modeled as
a continuum of measure 1. Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite. Each individual is inﬁnitely
lived.
At the beginning of each period, the community is divided into partnerships (or relationships),
and each pair of partners play a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage they play a prisoners’ dilemma
game, and each partner chooses either C, which stands for “cooperate,” or D, which stands for
“defect.” The payoﬀ matrix of this ﬁrst-stage game is speciﬁed momentarily.
After this stage, each partnership persists with probability ρ, and breaks with probability
1 − ρ. If a partnership persists, the two partners go into a simultaneous-move second-stage game,
in which each partner makes a stay-or-separate decision. If both partners choose to stay, the
current partnership continues into the next period. If at least one partner chooses to separate,
or if the partnership (exogenously) breaks, both partners go into a pool of unmatched players.
Players in this pool are randomly matched at the beginning of the next period, forming new
partnerships. Consequently, the dissolution and re-formation of partnerships are partly exogenous
and partly endogenous. No direct payoﬀs are associated with the second-stage game; its only role
is to endogenize the decision whether to interact with the same individual in the next period.
Since there is a countable number of time periods and a continuum of players, we assume that
no player is ever matched with one of his ex-partners. The timing convention we just described is
s h o w ni nF i g u r e1 .
There are three types of players in the population. There is a measure α of opportunistic types
that we denote by O,am e a s u r eβ of bad types that we denote by B,a n dam e a s u r eγ (=1−α−β)
of good types that we denote by G.AG-type player always chooses C in the ﬁrst-stage game, and
a B-type player always chooses D.A nO-type player chooses either C or D, depending on which
gives her a higher payoﬀ (which depends on the equilibrium play). The payoﬀ matrix of an O-type,
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Table 1: Payoﬀ matrix of an O-type
We assume b>a>0, l>0,a n d2a>b−l.T h eﬁrst two restrictions say that this game, when
played by two O-types, is a standard prisoners’ dilemma game. The third restriction says that the
action proﬁle (C,C) maximizes the sum of players’ payoﬀs when the game is played between two
O-types. The objective of all players is to maximize the discounted sum of payoﬀs.2 The discount
1A G-type player is either a “commitment type” (perhaps inherently moral), or has a payoﬀ matrix that is
obtained from Table 1 by subtracting a large number from the D row. Similarly, a B-type is either a commitment
type (inherently immoral), or a large number is subtracted from the C row. The subtracted number is bigger than
a,s ot h a taB-type’s payoﬀ is negative at (C,C). Because of that, playing unconditional D is a dominant strategy
for a B-type not only in the period game but also in the repeated game.
2The fact that G-types always choose C yet they are assumed to maximize their discounted payoﬀ is reconciled
as follows. In the ﬁrst-stage game they choose C because C is a dominant action (in the period game) for G-types.
In the second stage they may separate because they foresee a higher payoﬀ from being matched with types who play
C. Therefore, maximizing behavior is manifested in both stages.
7factor is common to all players and is denoted by δ,w h e r eδ ∈ (0,1).
We assume that monitoring is perfect inside each partnership: a player observes his partner’s
actions - beginning with the date at which this partnership is commenced. However, when a player
is matched to a new partner he knows nothing about the partner’s past history of actions with
other partners. That is, there are no information ﬂows across matches. Also, a player’s type is
private information. However, players make statistical inferences about types (of other players),
based on the actions they observe. In particular, a player observed to choose C is known not to be
a B-type, and a player observed to choose D is known not to be a G-type. We also assume that
the conﬁguration of types, (α,β,γ), are common knowledge.
Steady-state equilibria This is an inﬁnitely repeated community game with incomplete infor-
mation, so folk-theorem type arguments establish that there are many equilibria supported by a
variety of repeated-game strategies. For example, when β = γ =0 , Kandori’s (1992) “contagious
equilibrium,” in which each player plays D forever if either he or one of his previous partners played
D, is an equilibrium in our setting.
Rather than prove folk theorems, this paper focuses on a certain class of equilibria. This class is
deﬁned by two properties that strategies are required to satisfy, along with a speciﬁcation of certain
“initial conditions.” To state these properties we ﬁrst deﬁne the concept of a phase. A player is
said to be in the stranger phase, denoted S, if he never interacted with his current partner (i.e., if
he just entered into a new partnership). On the other hand, a player is said to be in the friendly
phase, denoted F, if he interacted at least once with his current partner.3 The ﬁrst property that
strategies are required to satisfy is that a player’s action, or mixed strategy, in the ﬁrst-stage game
only depends on which of these two phases he is in, and on no other aspect of his personal history
(this requirement rules out the contagious equilibrium). If this requirement is satisﬁed, we call the
mapping from phases to actions in the ﬁrst-stage game a behavior pattern. The second property
that strategies are required to satisfy is that a player’s action in the second-stage game is to separate
if, and only if, at least one partner defected (in the ﬁrst-stage game) at any point since the start
of the partnership. These two properties, along with initial conditions (regarding at which phase
each player is in initially), determine the measure of types in each phase at each point in time.
3Terminology borrowed from Ghosh and Ray (1996).
8The third requirement we impose is that these measures have settled to a steady state (at t =0 ),
and, as such, remain constant through time. We refer to equilibria with these three properties as
steady-state equilibria.
A few words are in order to explain why we focus on steady-state equilibria. The ﬁrst (and
obvious) reason is tractability. Indeed, as will be seen, we are able to fully characterize pure and
mixed-strategy equilibria in this class, relate them - via closed-form expressions - to underlying
parameters, and do comparative statics exercises. Arguably, one can expand our class of equilib-
ria, while preserving tractability. For example, one may study strategies in which the degree of
cooperation depends on the length of the relationship, i.e., where a player chooses C with a higher
probability in a relationship that have lasted for a longer time. We found, however, that straight-
forward generalizations of this sort do not lead to new insights. Another important property of
steady-state equilibria is that learning about one’s partner’s type (and thus behavior) does not
occur beyond the ﬁrst period of a relationship. This is true because the distribution of types within
the friendly phase is independent of the length of the relationship, and because perfect monitoring
reveals - in the ﬁrst period of interaction - all the information about one’s partner’s type that is
ever going to be revealed. Therefore, one may view the class of equilibria we study as those for
which behavior does not vary, if information does not vary.
Another (and perhaps more substantive) reason for focusing on steady-state equilibria is that
they capture behavior that seems “realistic.” Ordinarily (i.e., outside of the game-theory com-
munity), such behavior is explained using psychology or using emotionally charged language. For
example, it would ordinarily seem that defection has the eﬀect of “souring a relationship,” triggering
separation, and initiating a new relationship. But this is exactly what the separation strategy we
focus on speciﬁes. Likewise, it would seem that players view a new relationship as an opportunity
for a “fresh start,” and consequently would not let their past experience aﬀect it. But this, again,
is what a behavior pattern in our framework speciﬁes. An important feature of our analysis is
that there is no need to resort to explanations that are outside the purview of economics. Instead,
the behavior we study is equilibrium behavior, so one may view it as purely driven by economic
incentives and equilibrium reasoning.
9Objective of Analysis Having delineated the game and the class of equilibria we focus on,
we proceed to analyze them. Speciﬁcally, for any conﬁguration of parameter values (i.e., some
(a,b,l,δ,ρ,α,β,γ)-tuple) we determine whether an equilibrium exists, what type of behavior it
manifests, and whether it is unique. To this end, we note that some aspects of agents’ behavior
are already “hard-wired” into our setting. In particular, G and B-types are hard-wired to play C
and D, respectively, in the ﬁrst-stage game. In addition, we already speciﬁed that all player types
separate in the second-stage game if they encounter D (and this behavior is optimal because it gives
t h e mac h a n c et oi n t e r a c tw i t hp l a y e r sw h op l a yC, which generates higher payoﬀs). Given this,
the only aspect of behavior that remains to be endogenously determined is the behavior-pattern of
O-types in the ﬁrst-stage game. This will be the focus of the analysis in the next sections.
3 The Good Equilibrium
In this section we analyze a pure-strategy equilibrium, referred to as the good equilibrium,i n
which the behavior pattern of O-types is to play C in both phase S and phase F.T h a ti s ,O-types
behave exactly like G-types.
Steady State This behavior pattern, along with the previously described separation strategy,
induce a steady-state. The ﬁrst step in the analysis is to determine this steady-state, i.e., determine
the overall measure of agents in phase S, and its composition. To do that, we note that all B-types
are always in phase S. In addition, the fact that agents are sometimes exogenously separated
implies that a certain measure of G and O-types, henceforth called non-bad types, are also in phase
S.W el e tx ∈ [0,1 − β] be the measure of non-bad types in phase S. Then, the overall measure
of agents in phase S is x + β, and the overall measure of agents in phase F is 1 − x − β .I nt h e
steady-state of the good equilibrium x must satisfy




To interpret (1), note that its left hand side is the measure of agents ﬂowing from phase F into
phase S each period. This “inﬂow” is simply the probability of exogenous dissolutions, 1−ρ,t i m e s
the measure of agents in phase F, 1 − x − β. The right hand side of (1) is the measure of agents
ﬂowing from phase S to phase F each period. This “outﬂow” is the product of x,w h i c hi st h e
10measure of agents that could possibly depart phase S, the probability that one of these agents is
matched with another non-bad agent, which is x
x+β, and the probability, ρ, that such a match is
not exogenously dissolved after the ﬁrst interaction. In a steady-state the inﬂow equals the outﬂow,
which is satisﬁed for any x ∈ [0,1−β] that solves (1). Such solution to (1) is unique and, as stated
earlier, is the measure of non-bad types in phase S.
As (1) shows, this x depends on β and ρ, but, since the ensuing analysis focuses mostly on the
role of β,w ec o n s i d e rx as a function of β only, writing it as x(β).G i v e nx(β) and β we deﬁne the
variable y(β) ≡ β/x(β),o rs i m p l yy,w h i c hr e ﬂects the composition of bad versus non-bad types
in phase S. Given the behavior pattern we focus on, y also reﬂects the composition of behavior in
phase S, i.e., the ratio of agents choosing D to those choosing C ( m o r ep r e c i s e l y ,i ti st h er a t i oo f
the measures of these agents). We next state a simple, but important, property of y(β).
Lemma 1 y(β) is increasing in β, ranging from zero to inﬁnity, as β ranges from 0 to 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Value functions Given the behavior pattern prescribed by the good equilibrium and given the
steady-state corresponding to it, we deﬁne beginning-of-period value functions for O-types. Let
VF and VS be the discounted payoﬀs in phases F and S, respectively. Let V d
F be the discounted
payoﬀ when in phase F, deviating to D, and returning to prescribed behavior (i.e., C) thereafter,
a one-shot deviation. And let V d
S be the discounted payoﬀ of a one-shot deviation when in phase
S. The equations deﬁning these values are:







(−l + δVS) (3)
V d








(0 + δVS). (5)
As a representative of the logic on which these equations rest, consider the RHS of (2), which is the
discounted payoﬀ of an O-type at F.T h i sp a y o ﬀ is the sum of two terms: the period payoﬀ a (all
agents in phase F are non-bad types, play C and, consequently, receive a), and the continuation
11payoﬀ: With probability ρ the partnership continues and an O-type gets δVF; with probability
1 − ρ the partnership dissolves and an O-type gets δVS. All other value functions are based on a
similar logic.
Equations (2) and (3) represent two linear equations in two unknowns, VF and VS,s oo n ec a n
explicitly solve them. Doing so we get
VF =
(x + β − δβ)a − βδ(1 − ρ)l
(1 − δ)[x + β(1 − δρ)]
(6)
VS =
xa − β(1 − δρ)l
(1 − δ)[x + β(1 − δρ)]
, (7)
where x is the solution to (1).
Incentive Constraints Above we considered the “mechanics” of the good equilibrium, comput-
ing the steady-state distribution, and O-types’ discounted payoﬀs-assuming O-types follow the
hypothesized behavior pattern. Now we determine the conditions under which O-types have the
incentive to carry out this behavior pattern, i.e., the conditions under which this behavior pattern
is part of an equilibrium. The following two incentive constraints must be satisﬁed:
No deviation in phase F :0 ≤ VF − V d
F. (8)
No deviation in phase S :0 ≤ VS − V d
S. (9)
Analysis of these incentive constraints gives the ﬁrst result.
Lemma 2 (i) (8) is redundant if (9) is satisﬁed. (ii) The good equilibrium exists if, and only if,






(1 − δρ)l. (10)










Subtracting this last equation from (3), we get
0 ≤ VS − V d
S ⇔ 0 ≤
x
x + β





Since 0 <l , this last equivalency shows that (9) implies (8).
12(ii) Subtracting (5) from (3), we get








From (2) we have
VF − δVS = a + δρ(VF − VS).
Substituting the last equation into the one just before it, we get







≤ VF − VS.
Solving for VF −VS from (6) and (7) and substituting the result into the last inequality, we obtain
(10).
In words, Lemma 2 tells us two things. The ﬁrst thing is that it is “safer” to play C in phase F
than in phase S. Indeed, in phase F an O- t y p ei ss u r et oe n c o u n t e rC from her partner, resulting
in a payoﬀ of a, while in phase S she may encounter D, resulting in a payoﬀ of −l. Therefore, if it
pays to play C in phase S, it certainly pays to play C in phase F. The second thing that Lemma
2 gives is a reduced-form expression, (10), telling us when O-types optimally choose C, so that the
good equilibrium exists.
To elaborate on how to interpret (10), let us note that the choice between C and D in phase S
is governed by three forces. First, there is the long-term gain of switching from phase S to phase
F,w h i c hi sVF − VS. Second, there is the probability that this gain is realized, x
x+β. Third, there
is the short-term cost from playing C instead of D: An opportunist gets −l instead of 0 when
paired with a bad type, and she gets a instead of b when paired with a non-bad type. Condition
(10) summarizes the interplay between these three forces, giving us a reduced-form criterion to
determine whether the good equilibrium exists.
Existence of the good equilibrium Inspection of condition (10) shows that it depends on all
parameter values. As stated earlier, however, we wish to isolate the role that the heterogeneity of
types plays, i.e., the role that (α,β,γ) plays as regards the existence of the good equilibrium. To
this end, we use the deﬁnition y ≡
β
x to re-write (10) as
b − a ≤
y
1+y
δρb − y(1 − δρ)l ≡ f(y). (11)
13We give the RHS of (11) a name, f(y), since it will be used frequently in the analysis. Figure 2





Figure 2: The graph of f
Inspecting (11) we see that its LHS, b−a, is positive and independent of y. On the other hand,
its RHS is strictly concave in y,g o e st o0 as y goes to 0, and goes to −∞ as y goes to ∞ (see






Consequently, for the good equilibrium to exist, two conditions must hold: 0 <y ∗,a n db−a ≤
f(y∗).T h eﬁrst condition is necessary because, if y∗ ≤ 0,t h e nf is strictly decreasing and f(y) ≤ 0
for all 0 ≤ y, so obviously there is no 0 ≤ y for which 0 <b− a ≤ f(y). The second condition is
necessary because, if the inequality were reversed, f(y∗) <b− a, there would again not be a y for
which b − a ≤ f(y). After some manipulations, we eliminate the endogenous variable y,a n dw r i t e
the two conditions in terms of model primitives only:
(1 − δρ)l ≤ δρb and 4δρb(1 − δρ)l ≤ [a +( 1− δρ)(l − b)]2. (12)
This analysis shows that (12) is a necessary condition for the existence of the good equilibrium.
Condition (12) is also suﬃcient. Indeed, if (12) is satisﬁed, then, as shown in Figure 2, there is an
interval of y’s (a single point “interval” is possible), call it [y,y], where (11) holds and thus where
the good equilibrium exists. y and y are the small and the large roots of the equation f(y)=b−a,
14which are independent of (α,β,γ) (because f is). Since, as per Lemma 1, y is strictly increasing
in β, y ∈ [y,y] is equivalent to β ∈ [β,β],w h e r eβ is deﬁned by y = β/x(β),a n dβ is deﬁned
by y = β/x(β).M o r e o v e r , [β,β] does not include 0 or 1. This is because when β =0 , y =0 ,
and f(0) = 0. And, when β =1 , y = ∞,a n df(∞)=−∞. Either way, (11) does not hold.
Therefore, the interval of β’s that satisfy (11) is interior to (0,1). Also, observe that criterion (11)
is independent of γ, the proportion of good types.
We have now shown how the existence of the good equilibrium depends on the conﬁguration of
parameter values. Summarizing our analysis, we have the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) The existence of the good equilibrium does not hinge on γ,t h em e a s u r eo fg o o d
types. (ii) If (12) is not satisﬁed, then the good equilibrium does not exist. (iii) If (12) is satisﬁed,




The main insight from Proposition 1 is that for the good equilibrium to exist the measure, β,
of B-types must not be too small or too large. If β is too small, say β =0 , the fraction of B-types
in phase S is zero, which implies that behavior (under the hypothesized equilibrium strategy) in
phase S i st h es a m ea sb e h a v i o ri np h a s eF. But, then, there is no punishment for playing D,
and no reward for playing C.I f a n O-type chooses D in phase F, he goes into phase S,w h e r e
he encounters the same behavior he encountered in phase F, and receives the same payoﬀ,w h i c h
means he is not being punished. Conversely, if an O-type chooses C in phase S he goes into phase
F, where he again encounters the same behavior and receives the same payoﬀ,w h i c hm e a n sh ei s
not being rewarded. Therefore, if β =0 , VF = VS and the good equilibrium unravels. At the other
end of the spectrum, if the measure of B-types is too large, the probability of being matched with
a non-bad type in phase S, x
x+β, is next to nil, which destroys the incentive to play C,a n dt h e
good equilibrium unravels again. Only if the proportion of B-types is in some intermediate range,
not too small to reduce the eﬀectiveness of punishment in phase F, and not too large to discourage
cooperation in phase S, does the good equilibrium exist.
Another way to think about the structure of incentives in the good equilibrium is as follows. The
proportion of bad types in the community as a whole is β. However, as a result of the equilibrium
play, the proportion of bad types in phase S,
β
β+x, is bigger than β (β <
β
β+x because β + x<1 ).
15Intuitively, phase S is “contaminated” by a disproportionately large measure of bad types because
bad types never leave this phase. But this induces O-types to choose C,b e c a u s ec h o o s i n gD means
going to (or staying at) phase S, interacting with bad types with a non-negligible probability, and
receiving low payoﬀs. Without (a critical mass of) bad types this inducement/threat does not exist,
and neither does the good equilibrium.
Note also that the measure of G-types has no bearing on the existence of the good equilibrium.
The reason for this is that the incentive of an O-type to play C hinges only on the composition
of behavior in phase S.B u t ,s i n c eG-types and O-types behave alike in the good equilibrium, the
breakdown between the measures of these types makes no diﬀerence. Only the overall measure of
non-B-types (or, equivalently, the measure of B-types4)m a k e sad i ﬀerence.
Observe, ﬁnally, that the good equilibrium may not exist at all - no matter what β is. This
possibility is due to the values that other parameters assume. Most notably, if b−a is large enough,
so is the temptation to play D, which destroys the good equilibrium.
Stability Having commented on the structure of incentives at the good equilibrium, let us now
comment on its “resilience,” and on how the good equilibrium compares in this regard to the
contagious equilibrium à la Kandori (1992).
To this point we assumed that monitoring is perfect within a relationship. Consider now the
possibility of observational errors: A player observes her partner to play D (C) with probability
ε > 0, even though the partner actually chose C (D). Then, no matter how small ε is, an obser-
vational error eventually occurs, i.e., some player is erroneously observed to play D. Once that
happens, a contagious process is set in motion under the contagious equilibrium, whereby more and
more players defect, so cooperation in the community breaks down. By contrast, consider the good
equilibrium in our setting. This equilibrium continues to exist under the presence of observational
errors - for conditions analogous to (12), and as long as ε is small enough (one has to appropriately
modify the steady-state condition and the incentive constraints to account for the observational
errors). More importantly, cooperation does not break down in this equilibrium. Intuitively, in the
good equilibrium an agent that mis-observes his partner’s action separates from the partner, and
4Recall that the measures of B and non-B types add up to 1, so any condition on the measure of non-B types is
equivalent to a condition on the measure of B-types.
16both get a fresh start in a new relationship next period. In this new relationship, each partner
ignores the past and expects (rationally) that playing C bears a chance of being rewarded in the
future. Thus, the eﬀect of an observational error is local; it does not trigger the spread of uncoop-
erative behavior, and has no eﬀect on global behavior in the community. This diﬀerence between
the good equilibrium and the contagious equilibrium comes from the fact that we endogenize sep-
arations and re-start of relationships, which is exactly what ‘contains’ the impact of observational
errors.
Let us mention at this juncture that Ellison (1994) proposed another resolution to this non-
resilience problem - within the context of the contagious equilibrium. In Ellison’s framework the
contagious equilibrium is made resilient if players have access to a public randomization device.
Such device allows the severity of punishments to be adjusted and coordinated based on the outcome
of a device that everyone in the community can perfectly observe. In our view, however, reliance
on such device is a bit far fetched from a practical point of view. Indeed, it is hard to visualize
a whole community relying on a central device to synchronize everyone’s behavior. On the other
hand, severing relationships, starting new ones, and observing behavior only within a relationship
is a way to decentralize this outcome, which seems simpler and more realistic.
Comparative Statistics Since Proposition 1 provides a closed-form criterion (namely, (12)) -
written in terms of model primitives - to determine when the good equilibrium exists, one can
readily use it to derive comparative statics results. One comparative statics result, which is just
a re-statement of Proposition 1, is that the eﬀect of a change in β on the existence of the good
equilibrium is non-monotonic: When β is small the eﬀect is positive (an increase in β widens the
set of circumstances under which the good equilibrium exists), but when β is large the eﬀect is
negative.
Other comparative statics results are similarly derived. For instance, the eﬀect of increasing
δ is positive, i.e., (10) is satisﬁed under a wider set of circumstances. This mirrors conventional
wisdom conveyed by folk theorems. On the other hand, the eﬀect of the persistence probability, ρ,
is not so conventional, and is, in fact, non-monotonic. In one sense, an increase in ρ,“ s h o u l db e ”
equivalent to an increase in δ because it prolongs the longevity of relationships and, as such, should
always have a positive eﬀect. What we ﬁnd, instead (under a mild extra restriction), is that the
17eﬀect is non-monotonic. We ﬁrst state the result, then explain the intuition.
Proposition 2 Assume (1 −δ)(a+l) <b< a+l
1−δ,5 and a good equilibrium exists for some value of
ρ.T h e n ,t h e r ee x i s taρ and a ρ ∈ (0,1),w h e r eρ < ρ, so that the good equilibrium exists if, and
only if, ρ ∈ [ρ,ρ].
Proof. See the working paper.
The intuition is that an increase in ρ has two eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is what we mentioned
earlier: An increase in ρ prolongs the expected amount of time spent in phase F and, thus, makes
it more rewarding to play C in that phase. The second eﬀect is that an increase in ρ reduces the
measure of non-bad types in phase S. As a result, an O-type is less likely to be matched with a
non-bad type in phase S, which makes it less rewarding to play C in that phase. These two eﬀects
work in opposite directions. It turns out that when ρ is small the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, whereas
when ρ is large the second eﬀect dominates. Thus, in a community setting, a small possibility of
exogenous turnover (1 − ρ) may help, rather than hinder, cooperation. The reason for this is that
turnover introduces “ﬂuidity” into the system,6 enabling movements from phase S to phase F and,
thereby, generating incentives to play C in phase S.
Other comparative statics results, namely, with respect to parameters of the constituent game,
a, b and l, are derived straightforwardly and conform with expected intuitions; consequently, we do
not spell them out here (they may be found in the working paper version).
4 The Bad Equilibrium
In this and the next section we expand our approach to other steady-state equilibria. Our analysis
here expands the analysis in Section 3 in the sense that we unravel the structure of incentives at
these other equilibria, and pin down the conditions under which they exist. More broadly, our
analysis here makes two points. The ﬁrst point is that when the good equilibrium fails to exist for
some conﬁguration of parameter values, another steady-state equilibrium may exist. More than
5This assumption is satisﬁed if δ is large enough or if b = a + l, which is the condition that the component game
is a partnership game.
6When ρ =1agents are “stuck” in phase S, so there is no long-term reward for playing C. This can be seen from
equation (1), which shows that x =0 ,i fρ =1 .
18that, we show that some steady-state equilibrium exists for any conﬁguration of parameter values.
The second point is that for some conﬁgurations of parameter values, there may exist more than
one steady-state equilibrium.
Steady state To start with, we study a pure-strategy equilibrium, that we call the bad equilib-
rium,i nw h i c hO-types play D in phase S. Given the separation strategy, B-types and O-types,
henceforth called non-good types, are always in phase S. On top of those there is a certain measure
of G-types in phase S - because of exogenous dissolutions. Let x ∈ [0,γ] be the measure of G-types
in phase S. Then, the steady-state condition corresponding to the bad equilibrium is




Analogous to (1), the solution to (13) determines x as a function of γ. We let the ratio of non-good
types to good type in phase S be y ≡
1−γ
x(γ), which, as before, is also the ratio of agents choosing
D to those choosing C in phase S. Similar to the good equilibrium, one shows that y is strictly
decreasing in γ, approaches 0 as γ goes to 1, and approaches ∞ as γ goes to 0.
Value Functions and Incentive Constraints Since the hypothesized behavior pattern of O-
types here is such that they play D in phase S, they are never in phase F. Nevertheless, to check
whether this strategy is part of an equilibrium, the choice in phase F has to be speciﬁed. Obviously,
there are two possible speciﬁcations: either play D,o rp l a yC in phase F. We analyze these two
possibilities in turn.
• O-types play D in phase F
We ﬁrst deﬁne value functions. The notation is similar to that of the previous section, except
that the hypothesized behavior pattern in the bad equilibrium is diﬀerent, which generates a dif-
ferent steady-state and diﬀerent period payoﬀs. Making the requisite adjustments, the new value
functions are:




b + δVS (15)
V d





{a + δ[ρVF +( 1− ρ)VS]} +
1 − γ
x +1− γ
(−l + δVS). (17)
Given these value functions, the incentive constraints are:
No deviation in phase F :0 ≤ VF − V d
F. (18)
No deviation in phase S :0 ≤ VS − V d
S. (19)
Analyzing these constraints, we have the following result.
Lemma 3 (i) (19) is redundant if (18) is satisﬁed. (ii) A bad equilibrium in which O-types defect
in phase F exists if, and only if,
1 − γ
x +1− γ
δρb ≤ b − a. (20)
Proof. See the working paper.
Although Lemma 3 is the analogue of Lemma 2, two diﬀerences should be noted. First, the
binding incentive constraint here is in phase F, not in phase S. Second, b−a has to be bigger, not
smaller, than some threshold value. This is due to the fact that in the bad equilibrium opportunists
are supposed to defect, not cooperate.
• O-types play C in phase F
We carry out similar analysis as in the last case. For brevity, we just report the end result (a
proof is found in the working paper version).










20Unlike in Lemmas 2 and 3, no deviation in phase F does not imply no deviation in phase S,
and no deviation in phase S does not imply no deviation in phase F. That’s why two inequalities
(rather than one) have to be satisﬁed in condition (21).






(1 − δρ)l ≤ b − a. (22)
Existence of the bad equilibrium As we did with the good equilibrium, we transform condition
(22) to a condition that involves only the primitive data. To this end we re-write the RHS of (22)
in terms of y,g i v i n gu s :
y
1+y
δρb − y(1 − δρ)l ≤ b − a. (23)
As can be readily seen, (23) is similar to (11), with 1 − γ replacing β and reversing the inequality.
Thus, following the analysis leading up to Proposition 1, we derive the following result.
Proposition 3 (i) The existence of the bad equilibrium does not hinge on β, the proportion of bad
types. (ii) If (12) is not satisﬁed, then the bad equilibrium exists for any γ. (iii) If (12) is satisﬁed,
then the bad equilibrium exists if, and only if, γ ∈ [0,γ] ∪[γ,1] (equivalently if γ / ∈ (γ,γ)), where γ
and γ are found by solving f(
1−γ
x(γ))=b − a, and are such that 0 < γ < γ < 1.
Although Proposition 3 is analogous to Proposition 1, one feature of it merits discussion and
comparison to the traditional theory of repeated games. Namely, Proposition 3 shows that the
bad equilibrium does not exist for some parameter conﬁgurations. This contrasts with the theory
of repeated games, where an indeﬁnite repetition of a Nash equilibrium (the bad equilibrium in
our context) is the easiest equilibrium to construct. This is still true in our context if we consider
a community setting with good types, but without endogenously formed long-term relationships.
Therefore, Proposition 3 shows that with endogenously formed relationships, a new force comes
into play: An opportunist may cooperate in phase S in the hope of hooking up with a good type,
entering into phase F, and enjoying higher future payoﬀs. Therefore, having good types and the
possibility of forming long-term relationships may destroy the bad equilibrium. Proposition 3 pins
down the set of circumstances under which this force is suﬃciently strong that the bad equilibrium
does not exist.
21To be more speciﬁc about this set of circumstances, Proposition 3 shows that a bad equilibrium
does not exist if γ is in some intermediate range. If γ is small, all opportunists playing D in
phase S is an equilibrium because the probability of meeting a good type is too small. If γ is big,
all opportunists playing D in phase S is again an equilibrium, since the diﬀerence between the
continuation payoﬀs in phase F and phase S is too small. Thus, in both cases the bad equilibrium
exists. However, if γ is in some intermediate range, opportunists in phase S have a reasonable chance
of meeting a good type, and opportunists in phase F enjoy a signiﬁcantly higher continuation payoﬀ
than in phase S. Thus, the bad equilibrium does not exist when γ is in this range.
A convenient feature of Propositions 1 and 3 that we are going to exploit later is that there is a
duality between the existence of the good equilibrium and the non-existence of the bad equilibrium.
The incentive of an opportunist to cooperate in phase S (which is what it means for the good
equilibrium to exist, or for the bad equilibrium not to exist) depends on the proportion of agents
cooperating in that phase. Since this proportion is strictly decreasing in β in the good equilibrium
and strictly increasing in γ in the bad equilibrium, there is a duality between β and γ: If the good
equilibrium exists for some β, then the bad equilibrium does not exist for γ =1− β,a n di ft h e
bad equilibrium does not exist for some γ, then the good equilibrium exists for β =1− γ.A l s o ,
Propositions 1 and 3 show that the presence of bad types can support the good equilibrium, while
the presence of good types cannot. Analogously, the presence of good types can upset the bad
equilibrium, while the presence of bad types cannot.
5 The Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
In this section we study mixed-strategy equilibria in which the behavior pattern of O-types is
to mix instead of play a pure strategy (which is what they do in the good and the bad equilibria).
Since opportunists may mix in either or both phases, there are several types of mixed behavior
patterns to consider. As we show in the working paper version, however, several of these behavior
patterns do not give rise to equilibria, or give rise to equilibria that are behavior- and, hence,
payoﬀ-equivalent to equilibria we already considered. The only mixed behavior pattern that is not
like this is where O- t y p e sm i xi np h a s eS and play C in phase F. Consequently, we focus now on
this behavior pattern, investigating the circumstances under which it gives rise to an equilibrium.
As a matter of notation, we let λ be O-types’ probability of playing D in phase S.
22Steady state and value functions In a mixed-strategy equilibrium good types, bad types and
opportunistic types all behave diﬀerently. This requires the introduction of additional notation.
Let xα be the measure of O-types, and let xγ be the measure G-types in phase S. The steady-state
of a mixed-strategy equilibrium is characterized by a pair (xα,x γ) ∈ [0,α] × [0,γ],w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes
(1 − ρ)(α − xα)=( 1 − λ)xαρ
(1 − λ)xα + xγ
xα + xγ + β
(24)
(1 − ρ)(γ − xγ)=xγρ
(1 − λ)xα + xγ
xα + xγ + β
. (25)
Let z ≡ xα + xγ be the measure of non-bad types in phase S,a n dx ≡ (1 − λ)xα + xγ be the
measure of non-bad types that play C in phase S. Then, β + z i st h eo v e r a l lm e a s u r eo ft y p e si n
phase S,a n d
β+z−x
x is the ratio of agents playing D to agents playing C in phase S.7
The value functions of O-types, deﬁned under this mixed behavior pattern, are:







z + β − x
z + β
(−l + δV C
S ) (27)
V d






(b + δV C
S )+
z + β − x
z + β
(0 + δV C
S ),
where the superscripts on VS refer now to (candidate) equilibrium behavior, rather than to deviation
from such behavior (while the superscript on VF continues to refer to deviation).
Incentive constraints This mixed behavior pattern is an equilibrium if and only if analogous
incentive constraints are satisﬁed. After some manipulations, we simplify these constraints as
follows.




≤ VF − VS. (28)
Indiﬀerence in phase S: V D
S = V C




(z + β − x)l
δρx
. (29)
Since the RHS of (29) exceeds the RHS of (28), it suﬃces to require (29), which we re-write (after
solving for VF and VS)a s :
xa − (1 − δρ)(z + β − x)l





7β+z i st h ea n a l o g u eo fβ+x in the good equilibrium and 1−γ+x in the bad equilibrium;
β+z−x
x is the analogue
of
β
x in the good equilibrium and
1−γ
x in the bad equilibrium.
23As before, we let y ≡
β+z−x
x be the ratio of agents playing D to agents playing C in phase S.
Using the deﬁnition of y,e q u a t i o n( 3 0 )i sr e - w r i t t e na s
b − a =
y
1+y
δρb − y(1 − δρ)l ≡ f(y). (31)
Existence of mixed-strategy equilibria We note that (31) is the same as (11), except that an
equality is in place of the inequality. This narrows down the set of y’s that can be associated with
a mixed-strategy equilibrium to at most two values, y and y, which are the small and the large
roots of (31). From the discussion in Section 3 we know that if (12) is not satisﬁed, there are no
roots to equation (31) and, hence, no mixed-strategy equilibria. Therefore, to proceed, we assume
that (12) is satisﬁed.
Since it plays an important role, the dependence of y on λ is made explicit here, y(λ).O b s e r v e
now that when λ =0 , y =
β
xg,w h e r exg satisﬁes the steady-state condition of the good equilibrium
(under β), (1), and that when λ =1 , y =
1−γ
xb ,w h e r exb satisﬁes the steady-state condition of




xb ,a n dt h a ty(λ) is strictly increasing in λ.8 Therefore, as one varies λ over [0,1],t h ev a l u eo f




xb ]. Combining this with the fact that the y associated with any mixed strategy
equilibrium is either y and y, we conclude that a completely mixed-strategy equilibrium exists if




xb ) (“completely” means that 0 < λ < 1). Furthermore,
a mixed-strategy (unless we state otherwise mixed means completely mixed) equilibrium is unique





To be more precise about the set of circumstances under which a completely mixed strategy




xb . The LHS of this condition is equivalent to
β < β and the RHS is equivalent to γ < γ; this follows from the monotonicity of
β
xg in β,a n d
1−γ
xb
in γ,a n df r o mt h ed e ﬁnitions of β and γ. If this condition is satisﬁed, i.e., if (β,γ) ∈ [0,β)×[0,γ),
a λ ∈ (0,1) can be found which gives rise to a completely mixed-strategy equilibrium “replicating”




xb is equivalent to β < β and γ < γ, and when this condition
is satisﬁed, one can ﬁnd a mixed-strategy equilibrium replicating y. This gives us a complete
characterization of when mixed-strategy equilibria exist as a function of underlying parameters.
8This is parallel to the property that y is increasing in β for the good equilibrium, and in 1 − γ for the bad
equilibrium.
24We summarize the analysis as follows.
Proposition 4 If (12) is violated, there are no mixed-strategy equilibria. If (12) holds, then: (i)
A completely mixed-strategy equilibrium exists if, and only if, there is a λ ∈ (0,1) so that (24),




xb ), which is equivalent
to (β,γ) ∈ [0,β) × [0,γ) ∪ [0,β) × [0,γ). (iii) A mixed-strategy equilibrium is unique if, and only




xb ). (iv) In any mixed-strategy equilibrium, the ratio of agents
playing D to agents playing C in phase S is either y or y.
Having shown the set of circumstances under which a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be con-
structed and how to compute it, let us comment now about how this mixed-strategy equilibrium
relates to the procedure for constructing mixed-strategy equilibria in general, and how it relates to
the pure-strategy equilibria we studied in Sections 3 and 4. To be concrete we make these comments
for parameter conﬁgurations in the domain (β,γ) ∈ [0,β) × (γ,γ). We know - from Propositions
1 and 3 - that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist for such parameter values, and we also
know - from Proposition 4 - that a mixed strategy equilibrium does.
1. Let (β,γ) ∈ [0,β) × (γ,γ). Then, if all opportunists play C (which is what they do in the
good equilibrium), y<y(because β < β), which implies that an opportunist is better oﬀ playing
D. On the other hand, if all opportunists play D, y <y<y (because γ < γ < γ), which implies
that an opportunist is better oﬀ playing C. Such a “cycle” is the reason a pure strategy equilibrium
does not exist. But it is also the reason that a mixed strategy equilibrium exists (not only here, but
in general): speciﬁcally a mixed strategy is found by letting some opportunists play C and others
play D, or, more precisely, by ﬁnding an intermediate value of λ ∈ (0,1), so that when a measure λ
of opportunists play D and a measure 1−λ play C in phase S, opportunists’ choices are consistent
with each other’s, i.e., each opportunist’s choice is a best response to others’ choices.
2. One way to think about the mixed strategy equilibrium is that it endogenizes the measure of
bad types. Indeed, there is a measure β of bad types to begin with, but the measure of agents that
play D (which is the behavior manifested by bad types) is actually β < β = β + z − x.T h i s ,i n
eﬀect, means that the measure of bad types is endogenously increased via uncooperative behavior
of opportunists. Alternatively, one may think of the mixed-strategy equilibrium as endogenously
increasing the measure of good types from γ to γ.
253. Once the measures of commitment types is endogenously increased in this way, we can think
of the mixed strategy equilibrium as replicating the good equilibrium in a ﬁctional community with
β bad types or, equivalently, as replicating the bad equilibrium in a ﬁctional community with γ
good types. Either way, the measure of agents in phase S is β + z and the ratio of agents playing




x(β). These two variables are independent of the
particular value that (β,γ) assumes. Therefore, if we deﬁne aggregate behavior as this pair of
variables, we see that aggregate behavior in the community, at this mixed-strategy equilibrium, is
the same for all (β,γ) ∈ [0,β) × (γ,γ).
Likewise, mixed-strategy equilibria over other regions in the parameter space are equivalent to
pure-strategy equilibria (good or bad) in ﬁctional communities with β or β bad types, or γ or γ
good types. As stated earlier, what mixed strategies do is to (endogenously) increase the measure
of bad types to β or β and the measure of good types to γ or γ, enabling thereby the construction
of a pure strategy equilibrium. This trick works whenever there are suﬃciently many opportunists
to increase the measure of commitment types to the requisite critical values (which implies that a
mixed-strategy equilibrium exists for some parameter values but not for others). Obviously, this
trick does not work to decrease the measures of bad or good types (and it, obviously, does not work
to transform the behavior of commitment types).
6 Classiﬁcation of Equilibrium Outcomes
Propositions 1, 3, and 4 give a complete picture of how parameter conﬁgurations relate to diﬀerent
types of steady-state equilibria. In particular, taking some conﬁguration of parameter values, we
are now able to tell whether some steady-state equilibrium exists for this conﬁguration and, if so,
whether it is unique and of which type(s) it is. To graphically illustrate the result, we ﬁxt h e
values of all parameters other than (α,β,γ), and show how the equilibrium depends on (α,β,γ)
only. Since α + β + γ =1 , it is convenient to represent the various (α,β,γ)-triples in the simplex
β + γ ≤ 1,w h i c hi ss h o w ni nF i g u r e3 .
To elaborate on what Figure 3 shows, let us ﬁrst consider the existence of pure-strategy equilib-
ria. We know from Propositions 1 and 3 that the good equilibrium exists if and only if β ∈ [β,β],











Figure 3: Classiﬁcation of Equilibrium Outcomes
γ =1− β. Because of this, the simplex β + γ ≤ 1 is partitioned into six regions (to avoid tedious
statements a region is exclusive of its boundaries). In regions I, III,a n dVI, the bad equilibrium
exists, while the good equilibrium does not exist. In region IV, the good equilibrium exists, while
the bad equilibrium does not exist. In region V , both the good and the bad equilibria exist. In
region II, neither the good nor the bad equilibrium exists.
Let us turn now to completely mixed-strategy equilibria, determining whether they exist in each
of the above six regions, whether they are unique, and what type of behavior they manifest. To do
that, we consider four cases that exhaust the universe of possibilities.
Case 1 Neither the good nor the bad equilibria exist (region II in the simplex).
This case corresponds to
β
xg <yand y <
1−γ




xb ), i.e., there exists
a λ ∈ (0,1) so that
β+z−x
x = y. At the same time there is no λ ∈ (0,1) so that
β+z−x





xb ). Therefore, there is only one mixed-strategy equilibrium in region II, and the phase
S ratio of agents choosing D to those choosing C in it is y = y.
Case 2 The good equilibrium exists, but the bad equilibrium does not exist (region IV in the sim-
plex).








xb ), which means there are
no mixed-strategy equilibria.
Case 3 The bad equilibrium exists but the good equilibrium does not exist (Regions I, III and VI
in the simplex).
































xb ),i m p l y i n gt h e r e









xb ),s ot h e r ea r e
again no mixed-strategy equilibria.
Case 4 Both the good and the bad equilibria exist (region V in the simplex).
In this case y <
β
xg < y and y<
1−γ








xb ). This means there
is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium replicating y.
We summarize the existence of pure and mixed-strategy equilibria in Table 2.
Table 2: Characterization of Equilibria
Regions Pure-strategy equilibria Mixed-strategy equilibria
Region I Bad equilibrium None
Region II None One replicating y
Region III Bad equilibrium Two
Region IV Good equilibrium None
Region V Both equilibria One replicating y
Region VI Bad equilibrium None
28In summary, our analysis and Table 2 show that a steady-state equilibrium exists for each
conﬁguration of parameter values, and that the equilibrium is sometimes, but not always, unique.
The analysis also shows, for each of the six regions whether zero, one, or two pure-strategy equilibria
exist, and whether zero, one, or two mixed-strategy equilibria exist.
A numerical example We illustrate this characterization by means of a numerical example. Let
us specify parameter values, other than the conﬁguration of types, as follows:
a =4 ,b=6 ,l=2 ,δ =0 .9,ρ =0 .9.
Then, it is readily veriﬁed that (12) is satisﬁed for these parameter values, which, as per
Proposition 1, means that the good equilibrium exists for a range of β values. Indeed, the good
equilibrium exists if and only if f(
β
x(β)) ≤ 2=b − a.T h et w or o o t so ff(
β
x(β))=2are β =0 .143
and β =0 .702. Therefore, the good equilibrium exists if and only if β ∈ [0.143,0.702]. By duality,
the bad equilibrium does not exist if and only if γ ∈ (0.298,0.857). Table 3 specializes Table 2 to
these numerical results, and provides examples of mixed-strategy equilibria.
Table 3: Numerical Example
Regions Parameter Values Pure equilibria Mixed equilibria
I β ∈ [0,0.143);γ ∈ [0.857,1] Bad None
II β ∈ [0,0.143);γ ∈ (0.298,0.857) None β =0 .1,γ =0 .5; λ =0 .406
III β ∈ [0,0.143);γ ∈ [0,0.298] Bad β =0 .1,γ =0 .2;
λ =0 .271,λ =0 .936
IV β ∈ [0.143,0.702];γ ∈ (0.298,0.857) Good None
V β ∈ [0.143,0.702];γ ∈ [0,0.298] Both β = γ =0 .2; λ =0 .914
VI β ∈ (0.702,1];γ ∈ [0,0.298] Bad None
7W e l f a r e
In this section we construct measures of social welfare at certain steady-state equilibria, and show
how they relate to the conﬁguration of types, (α,β,γ). We already know from the analysis in
Section 6 that some (α,β,γ) conﬁgurations give rise to multiple equilibria, so numerous welfare
measures may be calculated. To limit the number of cases to report and to prepare for the analysis
29in the next section, we oﬀer two calculations. In the ﬁrst calculation we ﬁx the measure of good
types at zero, γ =0 , and compute welfare as a function of β at the best equilibrium corresponding
to this β. Then, in the second calculation, we ﬁx the measure of bad types at zero, β =0 ,a n d
compute welfare as a function of γ at the worst equilibrium.9 Our measure of welfare is the total
per-period payoﬀ to the whole community at the equilibrium in question. Since the overall measure
o fa g e n t si so n e ,t h i si st h es a m ea st h ea v e r a g ep e r - p e r i o dp a y o ﬀ.
Welfare as a function of β Suppose γ =0 . Then, specializing the analysis in Section 6, we have
a tripartite partition. When β < β (region III), three equilibria exist and the best equilibrium is
the mixed-strategy equilibrium replicating y.W h e nβ ≤ β ≤ β (region V ), two equilibria exist and
the best equilibrium is the good equilibrium. When β < β (region VI), the unique steady-state
equilibrium is the bad equilibrium.
Taking these three cases into account, social welfare takes the following form.
W(β)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − z − β)a +( β + z − x) x
z+βb + x[ x
z+βa −
β+z−x
z+β l] if β < β
(1 − x − β)a + β x
x+βb + x[ x
x+βa −
β
x+βl] if β ≤ β ≤ β
0 if β < β
, (32)
where x in the second line comes from the solution to (1), and x and z in the ﬁr s tl i n ec o m ef r o m
the solution to (24) and (25).
To elaborate on how (32) is arrived at, consider the middle term, β ≤ β ≤ β. Then, as stated
above, welfare is evaluated at the good equilibrium. Opportunists in this equilibrium get a period
payoﬀ of a in phase F, and get either a or −l in phase S, depending on whom they meet. Bad
types get either b or 0, depending again on whom they meet. Using the measures of agents at each
phase (which come from the solution to the steady-state equation), we take the average over these
payoﬀs, and get the reported expression.
Analyzing equation (32) we derive the following result, which is graphically illustrated in the
left panel of Figure 4.
Lemma 5 (i) When β < β, W(β) is constant; (ii) when β ≤ β ≤ β, W(β) is strictly decreasing,
and is hence maximized at β; (iii) when β < β, W(β) is zero.
9These two calculations relate to our previous results that the presence of B-type can support the good equilibrium
and the presence of G-type can upset the bad equilibrium.
30Figure 4: Welfare Measures
Proof. See the Appendix.
The reason W is zero for β < β is that welfare is evaluated at the bad equilibrium, where all
agents play D and collect zero. The reason W decreases for β ≤ β ≤ β is that welfare is evaluated
at the good equilibrium at which having more bad types is not necessary to induce opportunists to
play C.A sP r o p o s i t i o n1s h o w s ,β is already in the range that induces (all) opportunists to play
C, so having more bad types only reduces the average level of cooperation and, hence, the average
payoﬀ in the community. Finally, the reason welfare is constant for β ≤ β is that welfare (for each
β in this range) is measured at the mixed-strategy equilibrium replicating y. As commented earlier
(see comment 3 after Proposition 4), the aggregate behavior in the community at each of these
mixed-strategy equilibria is the same and, thus, the aggregate payoﬀ is also the same and is, thus,
constant.
An interesting feature of Figure 4 is that welfare decreases discontinuously at β = β.T h er e a s o n
for this is that an equilibrium sustaining some cooperation can be achieved for β = β and for β < β,
but not for β slightly above β (for β < β, the only equilibrium is the bad one). Therefore, as β
crosses β,a ni n ﬁnitesimal increase in β has a quantum eﬀect on the degree of cooperation in the
community and on welfare.
31Welfare as a function of γ Let us turn now to the case where there are no bad types, β =0 .
As γ varies over [0,1], the worst equilibrium varies as follows: When γ ∈ [0,γ] or γ ∈ [γ,1],t h e
worst equilibrium is the bad equilibrium; and, when γ ∈ (γ,γ), the unique equilibrium is the





x(−l)+( γ − x)a +( 1− γ) x
x+1−γb if γ ≤ γ or γ ≤ γ
(1 − z)a +( z − x)x
zb + x[x
za − z−x
z l] if γ < γ < γ
. (33)
Analyzing this welfare function we derive the following result, which is proven in the working paper
version, and is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 4.
Lemma 6 (i)When γ ∈ [0,γ] ∪ [γ,1], W(γ) is increasing in γ; (ii) when γ ∈ (γ,γ), W(γ) is
constant in γ.
Intuitively, as γ increases the average cooperation level in the bad equilibrium increases, and
thus social welfare increases. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium replicating y, aggregate behavior
is constant (i.e., independent of γ) and, thus, the social welfare in that equilibrium is constant too.
The relationship between the social welfare of the worst equilibrium and γ i sp l o t t e di nt h e
right panel of Figure 4. Analogous to the best equilibrium, social welfare has an upward jump at
γ. This is because the bad equilibrium no longer exists when γ is inﬁnitesimally bigger than γ.
8 Endogenous Choice of Types
In this section we extend the model to the scenario in which individuals endogenously choose their
t y p e sb yi n v e s t i n gi nh u m a nc a p i t a l .T h i se x t e n s i o ne n a b l e su st oa d d r e s st w oi s s u e s :O n ei st h e
interplay between investments in human capital and the level of cooperation in the community.
The other is the comparison between the equilibrium outcome in the game in which individuals
invest in human capital, based on their private returns, and the social optimum.
To motivate this extension consider the scenario in which a “partnership” is a team of profes-
sionals (say attorneys or accountants) that can reap higher beneﬁts working as a team than the
sum of beneﬁts that partners may collect on their own.10 To realize such beneﬁts, team members
10More explicitly, some of the advantages of team production come from synergies, large projects that require the
eﬀorts of several partners, or because team members exchange favors.
32must, however, be trained to execute team task, i.e., they must acquire human capital. Once they
have been trained, they still face an incentive (or a moral hazard) problem inasmuch as they have
the option to not cooperate, denying other team members the beneﬁts of cooperation. To this
point we have analyzed the incentive to cooperate in a community with heterogenous types, some
trained and some untrained. In this section we analyze the investment in human capital problem,
which determines how many individuals are trained in the ﬁrst place.
T om e r g et h i ss c e n a r i ow i t ht h ea n a l y s i st h u sf a r , we assume that initially all individuals are
bad types,11 and that each individual has the option of becoming an opportunist by investing in
human capital (the eﬀect of “investment” therefore is to expand the set of available actions). These
investments take place initially, and are followed by the community game we have analyzed. In order
to apply the analysis above, we continue to assume that types are unobserved. This assumption
is more objectionable in the context of this extension because one may verify an individual’s type
simply by asking for a diploma or interviewing a candidate. Nonetheless, what we have in mind
is that there are certain aspects of training and/or type that cannot be easily ascertained using
such methods. For example, it is hard to know how “seriously” the individual took her training
or how committed she is to apply the skills she acquired to team production. Hence, so long
as investment entails private information, and some residual uncertainty remains regarding the
outcomes of investments, the forces we identify here remain relevant (although their eﬀect may be
attenuated).
We proceed using the method of backwards induction. As usual, the equilibrium outcome in
the community game is what dictates incentives in the investment game. Taking this point of view,
the reason an individual may invest in human capital is that this enables her to interact over the
long-haul with other individuals that have invested too, reaping the beneﬁts of team production.
On the other hand, an individual that does not invest in human capital is deprived of the option of
entering into a long-term relationship and enjoying the beneﬁts of team production (she may still
reap a short-term beneﬁt before the relationship she is in is terminated). Whether this trade-oﬀ
is such that some (or all) individuals invest depends of course on the level of cooperation in the
community, which in turn depends on how many individuals invest. As stated earlier the aim of
this section is to analyze this interplay between investments and cooperation.
11We brieﬂy comment on the eﬀect of having good types at the end of this section.
33To be more concrete, we assume that investment in human capital costs c>0,w h i c hi st h e
same for all individuals, and is solely borne by individuals that make the investments (no subsi-
dies or surcharges to the acquisition of human capital). The timing of the extended game is as
follows. Initially all individuals are B-types. Then, before the community game starts, each indi-
vidual decides whether to invest in human capital (at cost c), or not. These decisions are made
independently and simultaneously. Once these decisions are implemented, the distribution of types
in the community is determined, and becomes common knowledge. Then, the inﬁnitely repeated
community game is played under this distribution. To limit the number of cases to consider, we
assume that players coordinate on the best equilibrium in this community game (this situation
parallels the ﬁrst welfare exercise of Section 7). We also assume that a steady-state is reached
immediately,12 and that individuals who invest are randomly assigned (at t =0 ) to phases F or S
according to the steady-state probabilities.
Before we proceed we note the existence of a degenerate equilibrium in which no one invests.
This equilibrium arises because of investment externalities: it takes a critical mass of agents to
invest to make it worthwhile for anyone to invest. In the sequel we focus (naturally) on other
equilibria.
Gross Return to Investment We are interested in determining the equilibrium outcome in
the investment game. To this end we derive the gross return to investment in human capital,
introducing the following notation. Let πO(β) (πB(β))b ea nO-type’s (B-type’s) discounted payoﬀ
at the best equilibrium under β in the community game. These payoﬀs are derived from the value
functions that correspond to this equilibrium.
If β ∈ (β,1],p a y o ﬀs are evaluated at the bad equilibrium, so that
πO(β)=πB(β)=0 .














12This assumption is justiﬁed if players are patient enough or the convergence to the steady-state is suﬃciently
fast.
34where VF(β) and VS(β) are given by (6) and (7), and x is the solution to (1) under β.














where x and z are derived from the solution to (24) and (25), and VF(β) and VS(β) are derived
from the solution to (26) and (27) under these values of x and z.
Let ∆(β) be the gross return to investment, which is the (discounted) payoﬀ diﬀerence between
being an O-type and a B-type at the best equilibrium in the community game,
∆(β) ≡ πO(β) − πB(β).
T h e n ,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Lemma 7 (i) ∆(β) ≥ 0 for all β ∈ [0,1]; (ii) ∆(β)=0for β ∈ (β,1]; (iii) ∆(0˙ ) > 0,a n d∆(β)
is increasing in β for β ∈ [0,β].( i v )A s s u m eb ≤ a + l.T h e n ,∆(β) increases at β,a n di se i t h e r
increasing throughout [β, β], or is hump shaped, i.e., there is a b β ∈ (β, β) so that ∆(β) is increasing
over β ∈ [β, b β) and decreasing over (b β,β].
Proof. See the Appendix.
The reason that ∆(β) is increasing in β over [0,β] is that welfare is evaluated at the mixed-
strategy equilibrium. Then, the aggregate behavior in the community (see comment 3 after Propo-
sition 4) is constant in β, which implies πB(β), VS(β) and VF(β) are constant as well. As a
consequence, the only eﬀect of a decrease in β is that an O-type has a smaller probability of being
assigned to phase F (at t =0 ), which makes πO(β) and, consequently, ∆(β) smaller.
This eﬀect is also present for β ∈ [β, β] (where welfare is evaluated at the good equilibrium).
There is, however, a second eﬀect for β ∈ [β, β],w h i c hi st h a tVF(β) − VS(β) is increasing in β.
These two eﬀects work in opposite directions, resulting in a (potentially) hump-shaped ∆ curve
over the domain [β, β].
Figure 5 illustrates the content of Lemma 7 (ignore for now the horizontal line with height c).
35Figure 5: Endogenous Types
Equilibrium in the investment game Given the shape of ∆, as shown in Figure 5, an equilib-
rium in the investment game may be either interior (with some but not all individuals investing),
in which case it is characterized by indiﬀerence between investing and not; or, it may be a corner
equilibrium (with all or none of the individuals investing), in which case it is characterized by a
weak preference for the unanimously chosen alternative. In symbols, these possibilities are:
Some but not all players invest : ∆(β) − c =0for some β ∈ (0,1)
Everybody invests : ∆(0) − c ≥ 0
Nobody invests : ∆(β) − c ≤ 0 for all β ∈ [0,1].
To determine which of these equilibria materializes, let us inspect Figure 5 that shows ∆(β),
which is the gross return to investment, along with the horizontal line at height c,w h i c hi st h ec o s t
of investment. This ﬁgure is drawn so that the c-line intersects the ∆(β)-curve at two points. The
other possibilities for drawing this ﬁgure are that the c-line lies entirely above the ∆(β)-curve, or
that it lies below it over the range [0,β]. Which of these possibilities materializes (which depends
on parameter values), pins down the type of equilibrium that occurs in the investment game.
Let’s consider the possibility shown in Figure 5. Since ∆(β) is hump-shaped, there are (po-
tentially) two intersection points, giving rise to two equilibria. We rule out the equilibrium at the
36higher intersection point, because it corresponds to an unstable equilibrium. Indeed, suppose that
β is decreased (say) a little bit from this equilibrium value. Then, from Figure 5, at the perturbed
point, c<∆(β−ε), so more individuals invest in human capital, which further decreases β,d r i f t i n g
the system away from the original equilibrium value. On the hand, if we decrease β at the equi-
librium with the lower intersection point, ∆(β −ε) <c , so less individuals invest in human capital
and β drifts back towards its original equilibrium value. As a consequence, the interior equilibrium
at the smaller β is stable, while the other is unstable. We concentrate from point onwards on the
stable one.
T u r n i n gt oc o r n e re q u i l i b r i a ,L e m m a7t e l l su st h a t∆(0) > 0. Thus, everybody invests if
c ≤ ∆(0), and we have a corner equilibrium. At the other end of the spectrum, if the c-line lies
entirely above the ∆(β)-curve, then no investment is a dominant strategy, and we have the other
type of corner equilibrium, with no one investing. Summarizing the analysis, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 (i) If c ≤ ∆(0), then everybody invests. (ii) If ∆(0) <c≤ ∆(b β), then somebody
but not everybody invests; moreover, the measure of players that invest in the stable equilibrium is
decreasing in c. (iii) If c>∆(b β), then nobody invests.
Proposition 5 shows that the level of human capital and the degree of cooperation in the
community are positively correlated in equilibrium. Indeed, let’s consider a decrease in c. Then,
the equilibrium measure of individuals investing in human capital either increases if this equilibrium
is interior, or stays constant if the equilibrium is corner. At the same time, the level of cooperation
increases if the equilibrium β is such that the community is at the good equilibrium, or remains
constant if the community is at the mixed-strategy or the bad equilibrium. Whatever combination
of these possibilities materializes, a decrease in the exogenous variable c induces a non-negative
correlation between the endogenous variables β and the degree of cooperation. As a consequence
of this, the model predicts that in communities with more educated populace, people are more civil
to each other.
Contrasting the Free entry equilibrium with the Social Optimum We contrast now the
equilibrium in the investment game to a planner’s optimum.
37Proposition 6 (i) If c<∆(β), then individuals over-invest at the free-entry equilibrium. (ii) If
∆(b β) <c<
W(β)
1−β , individuals under-invest in the free-entry equilibrium.
Proof. (i) If c<∆(β), the equilibrium measure of individuals that invest exceeds 1 − β.
But Lemma 5 tells us that gross welfare, W(β), is constant over [0,β], and we assumed a positive
investment cost c>0, so it does not pay (from a social planner’s perspective) for more than 1− β
individuals to invest.
(ii) The social planner maximizes S(β) ≡ W(β) − c(1 − β) over β. Given the shape of W (see
Lemma 7), if c<
W(β)
1−β , S(β) >S (1) = 0, so no one investing cannot be socially optimal. On the
other hand, since ∆(b β) <c , no one invests in the free-entry equilibrium.
Proposition 6 shows two departures of the equilibrium from the social optimum. On the one
hand, individuals may under-invest in human capital because some of the beneﬁt accrues to others
who interact with them, and are able to realize higher payoﬀs in the community game. On the other
hand, which might be more surprising, individuals may over-invest in human capital. This is because
individuals ﬁrst invest in human capital but then “undo” the investment by not cooperating.13 It
may seem bizarre that individuals, on their own volition, will choose to do so. The point, however,
is that there is a discrepancy between ex-ante and ex-post incentives. Ex-ante some agents acquire
human capital because this entitles them to enter into long-term, high-paying relationships. Ex-
post, when in transit between such relationships, an opportunist has a short-run incentive to defect.
Because of that investments in human capital are not fully utilized, which means they had been
wasted from a social point of view.
The impact of G-type on the investment game As Proposition 5 shows, an equilibrium with
no one investing in human capital may occur, depending on parameter values. This was shown on
the assumption that all agents are bad types to begin with, which implies the bad equilibrium in
the community game is a possibility. Suppose, on the other hand, that there is a core of good types
and, more speciﬁcally, that γ ∈ [γ,γ]. Then, as the analysis in Section 4 shows, the bad equilibrium
13Another way to think about this is that the maximum cooperation level in the community is reached when there
are β > 0 bad types. Further decrease in β cannot increase the cooperation level, since to sustain cooperation a
certain fraction of agents has to defect in the stranger phase. Therefore, if more agents than 1 − β invest in skill
acquisition, some agents’ investment are “reversed” (and are hence wasted) because of the structure of incentives in
the community game.
38in the community game is no longer a possibility. As a result, if ∆(b β) <c<e ∆(1 − γ),w h e r ee ∆
is the analogue of ∆ in a community with good types, the no investment equilibrium that would
have occurred without good types no longer occurs when the measure of good types exceeds some
critical mass. From this we conclude that the presence of good types can have a good inﬂuence on
the investment behavior of bad types, and help agents coordinate on a more eﬃcient outcome.
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419A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Proof. The solution to (1) is
x =
(1 − ρ)(1 − 2β)+
p
(1 − ρ)2 +4 β(1 − β)ρ(1 − ρ)
2
. (34)







(1 − ρ)( 1




β − 1)ρ(1 − ρ)
2
. (35)
Since all terms in (35) decrease in β, y(β) increases in β. Moreover, when β → 0, x/β →∞ ,a n d
y → 0. On the other hand, when β → 1, x → 0,a n dy →∞ .
P r o o fo fL e m m a5
Proof. (i) In stationary state, by abusing notation (both z and x are functions of β),
















But we know that, when β ≤ β, in the mixed-strategy equilibrium
β+z−x
x = y is independent of β.
Therefore, from (36) x is also independent of β.A sar e s u l t ,β + z is also independent of β.S i n c e
W(β) is only a function of x and z + β (see equation (32), we reach the conclusion that W(β) is
constant when β ≤ β.
(ii) First we show that 1−x−β, which is the measure of agents in phase F is strictly decreasing
in β. Suppose not, that is, suppose there exist a β0 and a β00 in [β,β] so that β0 < β00 and yet
1 − x0 − β0 ≤ 1 − x00 − β00,w h e r ex0 (x00) is the steady state x under β0 (β00). Then from (1)
x0 x0
x0 + β0 ≤ x00 x00
x00 + β00,
which is equivalent to
x0 1
1+β0/x0 ≤ x00 1
1+β00/x00.
But β0/x0 < β00/x00 since y is increasing in β. Therefore, we must have x0 <x 00, which implies
1 − x00 − β00 < 1 − x0 − β0,
42a contradiction.
Lemma ?? shows that x
x+β, the probability of being matched with a non-bad type in phase S,
is decreasing in β. From expression (32) we see that by increasing β, the average payoﬀ in phase
S decreases and the weight placed on this payoﬀ increases. Hence the total social welfare in the
community must decrease.
Proof of parts (i)-(iii) of Lemma 7
Proof. (i) An O-type has the option of playing D independent of her personal history, in which
case she realizes the same payoﬀ as a B-type. Hence, 0 ≤ πO(β) − πB(β)=∆(β).
(ii) If β ∈ (β,1], the unique steady-state equilibrium is the bad one. Therefore, ∆(β)=0 .




















From the analysis in Section 5 we know that both VS(β)=πB(β) and VF(β) are independent of β
(which follows from the fact that aggregate behavior is independent of β), and VS(β) <V F(β).F r o m
the same analysis, we also know that β+z is constant in β and, thus, that z is decreasing in β.B u t
then
z−β
1−β is decreasing in β and 1−z




1−βVF(β) is increasing in β, which implies ∆(β)=πO(β)−πB(β)
is increasing too. Finally, when β =0 , VS(0) = V B(0).S o ,s i n c e 0=VS(0) <V F(0) and 1−z
1−β is
positive, we have 0 < ∆(0).
Proof of part (iv) of Lemma 7
Proof. We ﬁrst show (a) the hump shapedness of ∆, then we show (b) it increases at β.
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x + β(1 − δρ)
,
43where x comes from (1) and VS and VF are given by (6) and (7). Using the variable y ≡ β/x(β),
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.





















−(1 − δρ)(a + l)




ρ +( 1+y)(1 − ρ)
(a + l)
(1 + y(1 − δρ))2
−
ρ(1 − ρ)





(1 − δ)[1 + y(1 − δρ)]2 ×
×
½
[b − (1 − δρ)(a + l)] + 2y(1 − δρ)[b − (a + l)] + (1 − δρ)[(1 − δρ)b − (a + l)]y2
(1 + y)2
+
ρ[1 − (1 − ρ)(1 − δρ)y2]
(ρ +( 1+y)(1 − ρ))2 (a + l)
¾
. (39)
We are going to show now that there is a 0 ≤ b y so that ∆0(y) is positive for 0 <y<b y and
negative for b y<y , which implies that ∆ has the desired hump shape property (if b y =0 , ∆ is
increasing throughout). Since 0 < 1
(1−δ)[1+y(1−δρ)]2,i ts u ﬃces to show this for the term inside the








Inspecting the two terms of ϕ we see that: (1) The denominator of each term is positive and
increasing in y. (2) Each numerator is quadratic and, because a+l ≤ b,i td e c r e a s e si ny and tends
to −∞ as y →∞ . From these observations we infer that there are two points 0 ≤ y1 and 0 <y 2
so that the ﬁrst term is positive for y<y 1 and negative for y1 <y , and similarly for the second
term. In addition, one readily veriﬁes that y1 <y 2,s ot h a tϕ is positive for [0,y 1] and negative for
[y2,∞).
It remains to analyze the behavior of ϕ over (y1,y 2). By continuity, there exists a b y ∈ (y1,y 2)
so that ϕ(b y)=0 . To show that b y is unique, which would bring the proof to a conclusion, it suﬃces
to prove that ϕ0(b y) < 0.
44Since y1 <y 2, we know that
f1(b y)
g1(b y) < 0 <
f2(b y)






















< 0 ⇐⇒ f0
1g1 <f 1g0
1.
Substituting in for f1 and g1, leaves us with the following inequality to prove:
(1 + y)2 {2(1 − δρ)[b − (a + l)] + 2(1 − δρ)[(1 − δρ)b − (a + l)]y}
< 2(1 + y)
©
[b − (1 − δρ)(a + l)] + 2y(1 − δρ)[b − (a + l)] + (1 − δρ)[(1 − δρ)b − (a + l)]y2ª
.
Dividing both sides of this inequality by 2(1 + y), we need to show that:
[b − (1 − δρ)(a + l)] + 2y(1 − δρ)[b − (a + l)] + (1 − δρ)[(1 − δρ)b − (a + l)]y2
> (1 + y){(1 − δρ)[b − (a + l)] + (1 − δρ)[(1 − δρ)b − (a + l)]y}
=( 1 − δρ)[(1 − δρ)b − (a + l)]y2 +( 1− δρ)[(1 − δρ)b − (a + l)]y +( 1− δρ)[b − (a + l)]y
+(1 − δρ)[b − (a + l)]
=( 1 − δρ)[(1 − δρ)b − (a + l)]y2 +( 1− δρ)[(2 − δρ)b − 2(a + l)]y +( 1− δρ)[b − (a + l)].
Looking at the two ends of this inequality, and comparing term by term establishes that this
inequality holds.
(b) Consider the two terms of (39), evaluated at y.T h eﬁrst term is equivalent to
d(VS(y)−πB(y))
dy ,
which is positive at y because VS(y)−πB(y)=0and 0 <V S(y)−πB(y) for all y ∈ (y,y).A l s o ,s i n c e
y1 <y 2, we have that the numerator of the second term of (39) is positive. Since the denominator
of the second term is always positive, this term is positive as well, so altogether 0 < ∆0(y). Finally,
since β and y are monotonically related, this implies 0 < ∆0(β).
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